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Abstract 
In this paper we focus on taxpayer choices of return preparation services. Using ag­
gregate nested logit techniques, we find that the demand for third party preparation 
responds to many factors: age, education, employment status, federal auditing, and 
tax return characteristics. Perhaps most improtant among these is federal auditing. 
Higher federal audit rates increase the demand for tax practitioner services, but do not 
affect the demand for other modes of third party assistance. More generally, as the tax 
burden increases, or as uncertainty about true tax liability increases, the demand for 
all modes of third party assistance increases. 
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1 Introduction 
The IRS has estimated that 44.2 percent of the individual returns filed in 1979 were self 
prepared, and that these returns accounted for 22.8 percent of detected noncompliance. 
Returns prepared with third party assistance accounted for 55.8 percent of filings and 
77.2 percent of the detected noncompliance. Among returns prepared with third party 
assistance, however, underreported tax was not uniformly distributed. Only 10.6 per­
cent of all taxpayers used a tax practitioner (certified public accountant or attorney) 
yet their returns accounted for 32.5 percent of underreported tax, 1 34. 7 percent used
paid preparers accounting for 40.9 percent of underreported tax, 2 and the remaining 
lOA percent used non-paid assistance accounting for 3. 7 percent of underreported tax. 3 
Population frequencies of third party assistance and the associated frequencies of tax 
noncompliance are reported below in Table 1. 
The current IRS estimate for total noncompliance from individual tax returns in 
1988 is approximately $85 billion (Internal Revenue Service, 1990). If the 1979 IRS 
1 A tax practitioner is automatically able to represent clients before the IRS. Paid preparers may 
provide these services only after passing a written exam sponsored by the IRS, and fulfilling certain 
continuing education requirements. 
2Paid preparers include public accountants with 6.2 percent of the returns filed, national tax services 
with 9.5 percent of the returns filed, local tax services with 11.6 percent of the returns filed, and mis­
cellaneous forms of paid third party assistance with 7.4 percent of the returns filed. Public Accountants 
are licensed at the state level with requirements varying by state. Only four states, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Kansas, and Wyoming do not regulate Public Accountants. National Tax Services, which in 
1979 consisted entirely of H & R Block and Beneficial Financial Services Co., and Local Tax Services 
often provide their own training, but do not require employees to be Public Accountants. 
3These estimates are based on the Special Academic Research File of the 1979 Individual Return Tax­
payer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). The 1979 TCMP for individual taxpayers consists 
of a stratified random sample of approximately 50,000 individual taxpayer returns from the population 
of all individual taxpayers. Each return is subjected to a detailed line by line audit, the goal of which 
is to uncover all taxpayer errors in reporting. The Special Academic Research File has been assembled 
by the Taxpayer Compliance Group of the Internal Revenue Service Research Division, and contains 
the 1979 L11dividual Return data. aggregated to the IRS adn1inistrative district level. There are 58 IRS 
administrative districts. Each district corresponds to a state except for California, Illinois, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas which have multiple districts. 
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estimate of the proportion of non-compliance attributable to returns signed by paid 
preparers or practitioners is still accurate for 1988, then over $65 billion of unpaid tax 
could be attributable to such returns. Although some theoretical and empirical work 
has begun to characterize the impact of third party assistance on tax compliance, no 
clear picture has yet emerged. A complete characterization would include analyses of 
taxpayers' choices of third party assistance (if any), the effect of third party assistance 
on taxpayer compliance, and the IRS posture towards returns completed in various 
ways. In this paper we focus on taxpayers' choices of third party assistance.4 5 
Tablel 
NUMBER OF RETURNS, FREQUENCY, AND PROPORTION OF 
NONCOMPLIANCE BY PREPARATION MODE FOR 1979  
Total Returns Filed Proportion of 
Mode of Preparation Number Frequency Noncompliance 
Self 39959000 .442 .228 
Non-Paid 
IRS assisted 6 1265686 .015 .004 
Other Non-Paid 7 8317320 .089 .033 
Paid Preparers 
Public Accountant 5605200 .062 .102 
National Tax Service 8588600 .095 .054 
Local Tax Service 10488000 .116 .132 
Other Paid 6690000 .074 .122 
Practitioners 
CPA 8 6057200 .067 .258 
Attorney and CPA 3435450 .039 .067 
Total 90406000 1.000 1.000 
Source: Special Academic Research File of the 1979 Individual Return TCMP 
4With the exception of Erard (1990) , who estimates both the demand for third party assistance and 
the effect of third party assistance on tax compliance conditional upon the mode of assistance used, 
the empirical literature in economics on third party assistance has focused on the effect of third party 
assistance on taxpayer compliance. For examples, see Mazur and Nagin (1987) , Milliron and Toy (1988) , 
Westat (1987) , and Klepper, Mazur and Nagin (1988). Little is known outside the IRS about the IRS 
posture towards returns completed in various ways. 
5The accounting literature that addresses the demand for accountant services has focused on the pro­
vision and quality of auditing services, and not the preparation of individual tax returns. For examples, 
see Benston (1985), Shockley and Holt (1983), and Dopuch and Simunic (1980). 
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Using aggregate nested logit techniques, we find that the demand for third party assis­
tance responds to many factors: age, education, employment status, federal auditing, 
and tax return characteristics. Perhaps most important among these is federal audit­
ing. Higher audit rates increase the demand for practitioner services, but do not affect 
the demand for other third party assistance. More generally we find that as the tax 
burden increases, ceteris paribus, the demand for all modes of third party assistance 
increase. For example, increases in the number of tax dependents, or decreases in the 
amount of deductions increase the demand for third party assistance. With respect to 
socio-economic characteristics, states with a higher percentage of the adult population 
having recieved at least a high school education show lower demand for IRS or other 
non-paid assistance compared to self preparation. 
Among these results, it is noteworthy that increases in the amount of deductions 
decrease the demand for third party assistance. This is contrary to the view that 
greater amounts of deductions are associated with more complex tax returns and thus 
should increase the demand for third party assistance. 
An important feature of our analysis is the use of aggregate nested logit techniques. 
The nested logit method is well suited to the estimation of discrete choice models 
when there are many alternatives and when the choices can be partitioned into groups 
composed of similar alternatives. The appropriate partition among modes of third party 
assistance reinforces two aspects of the demand for tax preparation services previously 
emphasized in the theoretical literature. 9 The first concerns the service aspects of 
third party assistance, typically provided by tax practitioners. The second concerns 
the desire by taxpayers to file tax returns which accurately reflect their true tax liability. 
Thus we combine CPA's and attorneys into a single category labelled practitioner and 
we combine public accountants, national tax services, local tax services, and other paid 
preparers into a single category labelled paid preparers. We also combine IRS assistance 
with other non-paid assistance into a single category labelled non-paid assistance. 10 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 su=arizes pertinent findings of the 
literature on third party assistance. Section 3 presents an econometric specification 
of the demand for tax preparation services. Section 4 describes the data we use and 
models we estimate. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 contains conclusions. 
6The IRS Assistance category consists of three services. They a.re IRS Advice, with a population fre­
quency of .011; IRS Prepared, with a population frequency of .001; and IRS Reviewed, with a population 
frequency of .004. 
7The other nonpaid category usually consists of a family member who helps prepare the return. We 
have combined in this category all VITA prepared returns. VITA is an acronym for Volunteer Income Tax 
Assistance, which consists of unpaid volunteers who prepare returns after receiving limited instruction, 
typically from the IRS. 
8CPA is an abbreviation for Certified Public Accountant. 
9Q,,. .. "R .. � ........ ... �� ...... ... ..l llT:t..l- /1non\ --..1 c_i __ .. _1.--� /1non\ ._. __ ... � .......  & ...... ... u .... .. .... ••ill.lie;'. \.LUUUJ1 .s.uu �\;U\ol,;lllUer \.L�O�J· 
10See footnotes 5 and 6 above for a description of IRS and other non-paid assistance. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Results 
Economic theory has only recently focused on the demand for third party assistance 
and its role in tax compliance. Scotchmer (1989) suggests that if taxpayers are not 
sure of their true taxable income, they will tend to overreport their tax liability. In 
her models, taxpayers hire the services of knowledgeable third parties who reduce or 
eliminate uncertainty, and thereby lower the amount of reported tax liability. 
Reinganum and Wilde (1989) propose a model that focuses exclusively on the service 
aspects of third party assistance. They characterize four types of equilibria, depending 
on whether taxpayers prefer to use tax practitioners and whether the IRS prefers them 
to use tax practitioners. In the empirically relevant case, which occurs when tax prac­
titioner penalties for noncompliance are sufficiently low and the efficiency gains from 
using practitioners are sufficiently high, the IRS prefers taxpayers to prepare their own 
returns, but taxpayers prefer to use a tax practitioner. In this case, the use of a tax 
practitioner is associated with lower compliance and higher audit rates. 
Ln a subsequent paper, Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1989) analyze a model in 
which taxpayers can purchase expert opinions: Favorable opinions reduce the proba­
bility of a penalty on return items for which the tax code is ambiguous. This model is 
similar to that of Klepper and Nagin (1989) with the exception that in the former the 
tax authority is modeled as an endogenous actor responding to taxpayers' decisions to 
purchase expert opinions. 
2.2 Empirical Results 
Slemrod and Sorum (1984) present data from a 1982 survey of 600 Minnesota taxpayers 
designed to assess the cost of compliance with the federal income tax. They estimate the 
marginal cost of return preparation for each respondent as a function of the willingness 
to work extra hours and after tax income. The main results from their analysis are that 
the incidence and expense of using a paid third party increases with income, age and self 
employment. Using the same data, Slemrod (1989), estimates the choice between using 
third party assistance and self preparation conditional upon the decision to itemize 
deductions. He finds that for taxpayers who itemize deductions, higher marginal tax 
rates increase the demand for third party assistance. A more recent survey undertaken 
by Collins, Milliron, and Toy (1988) assesses taxpayer attitudes towards filing tax 
returns. These authors find that nearly 70 percent of taxpayers want most to file the 
correct return, while 25 percent want most to minimize taxes and only a small number 
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want most to minimize effort. They also find that increases in income and age increase 
the likelihood of engaging paid third parties, while greater tax knowledge decreases the 
likelihood of engaging a paid third party. Hite (1987) obtains similar results, reporting 
that the probability of using a paid third party increases with age, complexity of return, 
and the probability of an audit. 
Using data from the IRS 1983 Individual Master File, Long and Caudill (1987) find 
that increases in income, age, return complexity, number of dependents, and federal 
and state marginal tax rates increase the probability of using a paid third party. 
Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1989) use administrative district level data from the 1979 
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program to estimate the probability that a paid 
third party will be used. They find that many forms of complex income increase the 
probability of using a paid third party, while higher levels of education, unemployment, 
and the percentage of the population between 45 and 65 years old significantly reduce 
the probability of using a paid third party. Unlike Long and Caudill, they find no 
significant relationship between the state income tax rate or self employment and the 
use of a paid third party. 11 
In a recent paper, Erard (1990) studies the demand for tax preparation services 
using a trinomial probit of the choice to use self preparation, a tax practitioner, or any 
other mode of third party assistance (either paid or nonpaid) . Using a random sub­
sample of the 1979 TCMP individual records, he estimates th.e demand for third party 
assistance as a function of types of income on returns, audit history, and whether the 
taxpayer was over 65 years of age. 12 He finds that the probability of using a practitioner 
relative to self preparation increases with the presence of income from capital gains, 
small business or farm activity, and rents and royalties, the marginal tax rate, number 
of tax forms attendant the return, being over the age of 65, previous audit history, and 
the IRS district audit rate. He also finds that the probability of using any other form 
of third party assistance relative to self preparation increases with income from small 
business or farm activity, and rents and royalties, being married, or over the age of 65, 
the number of forms attendant the return, and the IRS district level audit rate, while 
it decreases with the marginal tax rate. 13 
110ne major difference between the Individual Master File data used by Long and Caudill, and the 
TCMP data used by Dubin, Graetz and Wilde is that the Master File data contains only amounts 
reported on returns while the TCMP data contain corrected amounts resulting from IRS examinations 
of returns. The latter study uses the collected amounts and therefore avoids potential problems with 
endogenous reported tax return items. 
12 Absent from his specification are socio-economic variables such as education, and tax return items 
such as exemptions and deductions. 
13Feinstein (1989) has shown that it may not be possible to separate the effects of income and marginal 
tax rates using TCMP individual data. The significance of both income and marginal tax rates in Erard's 
work may result from the use of a categorical measure of income combLned with a. continuous measl!!'e 
of marginal tax rates. 
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The preceding review of both theoretical and empirical results suggests two hy­
potheses which we test in this paper. The first hypothesis is that taxpayer use of third 
party assistance increases with total and complex income, audit rates, tax rates, and 
age while it decreases with the level of education attained and the unemployment rate. 
The second hypotheses is that taxpayers use third party assistance to reduce uncer­
tainty about the correct amount of tax owed and to reduce the time costs of return 
preparation and compliance with the tax code. 
These two hypotheses are to some extent related. For example, if higher income 
is associated with higher opportunity costs of time, then increases in income increase 
the time costs associated with filing tax returns. Similarly, increases in audit rates 
directly increase the time costs of filing when these costs include time spent meeting 
the requirements of an audit. Futher, more education or less income from sources other 
than wages, interest, or dividends may be associated with less uncertainty about the 
correct tax liability, and thus reduce the demand for preparation services. 
3 A Model of Paid Preparer Selection 
With the exception of Erard (1990), the empirical literature has focused on the choice 
between self preparation and all modes of third party assistance. This is an unfortunate 
consequence of both the data researchers have used and the models they estimate. We 
next describe an aggregate nested logit model which distinguishes among the modes of 
third party assistance. 
We conceptualize the taxpayer's choice as a two stage sequential process. 14 In the 
first stage the taxpayer chooses one of the following categories: (1) nonpaid assistance, 
(2) self preparation, (3) paid preparer or ( 4) practitioner. In the second stage the 
taxpayer makes a further decision regarding which mode of assistance to use within 
the broader category. Let i = 1, . . .  , I index the taxpayer choice of category, and let 
j = 1,2, . . .  ,J; index the decision, conditional upon using category i, to choose from 
a set of J; specific assistance modes. We assume that the taxpayer derives utility U;; 
from alternative ij where 
U;; =Vi;+ e;;, (1) 
and where Vi; is a function of non-stochastic observed attributes, and E;; is a ran­
dom component of unobserved attributes. The probability that the individual chooses 
140ur model of individual choice falls into the class of random utility models (see McFadden, 1981). 
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alternative ij is 
P;; P[U;; ;::: Uki. V kl # ij)
P[Vi; + £;; ;::: Vii + Ekz. V kl # ij)
P[Ek1- €; ::::::Vi; -Vii. v kl# ij).
The strict utility component is assumed to be of the form 
Vi; = (3' X;; + a'Y;
(2) 
(3) 
where X;; is a vector of observed attributes varying with each of the j alternatives
in the i'" category, and Y; is a vector of observed attributes varying only with the i'" 
category. We also assume that €;  has a generalized extreme value distribution with 
cumulative distribution function 
( I ( J; ) e;) 
F( £; 11) = exp -I: I: e-•;;/e; , 
i=l 1=1 
where€ = (€; ). Under these assumptions, McFadden (1978) demonstrates that P;i can 
be written as the product of the conditional probability P;1; and marginal probability










where I; denotes the expected maximum utility (or inclusive value) taxpayers derive 
from alternatives in the z"t" category, 
J; 
I; = log I: e13' X;;
j=l 
and II; is a measure of the dissimilarity of alternatives in the i'" category. 15
(6) 
15McFadden {1978) proves that if the random component of the utility function is specified with the 
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Our data, as already noted, has been aggregated to the IRS administrative dis­
trict level. With aggregate data, we estimate Pili and P; using minimum chi-square
estimation techniques. 16 We form the log odds for equation (4) as 
log [�::] =�'(Xii - Xil) Vj =f. 1. (7) 
Similarly, we form the log odds for equation (5) as 
Vi =f. 1. (8) 
To estimate equations (7) and (8) requires estimates of the choice probabilities 
for which the natural measure is the observed population frequencies. Denote the 
probability of an individual in the k1h IRS district choosing alternative ij as Pi�· Since
alternatives are exclusive, and together exhaust all possibilities, it follows that for any 
IRS district k, L;{=1 L:f;. 1 Pi� = 1. Let the number of cases in the k1h IRS district beNk and denote the frequency of occurrences of alternative ij in district k as
(9) 
where Ski; is an indicator equal to one if the h1h person in district k chooses alternative
ij. 17 Suppressing the superscript k, we stack the log odds of alternative ij relative to
alternative il in each IRS district as 
(10) 
GEY distribution, and if 8 is between 0 and 1, the resultant nested logit is consistent with random utility 
maximization. If e = 1, then the choice of an alternative is unaffected by the presence or absence of 
other alternatives, i.e., all alternatives are independent of each other. In this restrictive case, the joint 
probability I';; is of the multinomial logit form. A value of 8 in the interval (0, 1) constitutes rejection 
of this independence, and the joint probability I';; is of the nested multinomial logit form. In this case, 
alternatives are independent only within a category. H 9 = O, the nested logit model assesses the choices 
among alternatives in category i as if there was a single maximal alternative. 
16These techniques were developed by Berkson (1944) in the field of bioassay, but are well suited to any 
choice estimation problem with a limited set of alternatives and many observations for each alternative. 
Our development follows Amemiya (1985). 
17 Our observations have an average of 65 individuals per cell. Monte Carlo evidence reported in 
Domencich and McFadden (1975) shows that when cell sizes are large (over 30 observations) the Berkson 
estimator of equation (7) has very small bias, even when the cell variances are large. (see Table 5.1, 
page 113) 
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for i - 1,2,3,4 and j = 2,3, ... ,J;
where µiii - log [Fili] - log [Pili] .Fili Pili 
Similarly, we stack the log odds of category i relative to category 1 as 
log r::J - a'(Y; - Yi)+ o;(Ii - Ii)+µ;
for i - 1, 2,3,4
where µi log r::J - log [;;J. 
Straightforward calculations show that 
E(µili) = 0 
V (µiii) -
� (�Ii + p�li) 
for j f= 1,
for j f= 1. 
and that E(µi) 
V(µi) -
1 ( 1 1 )
N Pi+ Pi 







This covariance structure allows for minimum chi-square estimation of the nested 
logit model, correcting simultaneously for two sources of heteroskedasticity. Since 
P;; changes with each alternative, the variance is heteroskedastic. Further, N is not
constant, but varies with the size of the IRS district, adding an additional source of 
heteroskedasticity. Finally, induced correlation with the comparison group (the alter­
native in the denominator of the log odds in equations (10) and (11)) is accounted for 
by the covariance terms.18
18Note that sequential estimation of the simultaneous equation system given by equations (10) and 
(11) is fully efficient because cov(µ;, µ;1;) = 0. Amemiya (1978) shows that in general this condition does 
not hold for the nested logit model, and as a result, sequential estimation can entail a loss of efficiency 
compared with full information procedures. 
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4 Model Specification 
4.1 Data 
The Special Academic Research File of the 1979 Individual Return TCMP defines 
12 modes of third party assistance. Seven cover paid preparers or practitioners and 
five cover nonpaid assistance. An additional mode covers self-prepared returns. To 
avoid districts with too few observations for an alternative, we combine all attorneys 




Attorney, or Attorney and CPA 
Certified Public Accountant 
The four paid-preparer alternatives are: 
NTS - National Tax Service 
LTS - Local Tax Service 
PA - Public Accountant 
OPP - Other Paid Preparer. 





IRS prepared, IRS reviewed, or IRS assisted 
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance, or Other Nonpaid Preparers 
Self-prepared. 
Our explanatory variables include the IRS audit rate, RATE, the percent of the 
adult population over 65 years of age, AGE65, the percent of the adult population 
with at least a high school diploma, EDUCATE, and the percent of the work force 
employed in manufacturing, PERMAN. IRS district level audit rates were constructed 
using data from the 1979 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 
The percent of the adult population with at least a high school education, the percent 
of the adult population over age 65, and the percent of the work force employed in a 
manufacturing industry are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States for the 
year 1979. 
The tax return items we use reflect the TCMP adjusted levels for three basic compo­
nents of the tax calculation, income, deductions, and exemptions. Objective measures 
of these three components of the tax retmn more accurately reflect the true tax situ­
ation of the taxpayer before engaging the services of a third party. EXEMPT is the 
19In particular an alternative with zero observations leaves the log odds of equation (10) undefined. 
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total number of exemptions eligible to be claimed on returns in an IRS district net of 
the over 65 years of age and blindness exemption. This variable measures the number 
of tax dependents. DEDUCT is the total amount of allowable deductions on returns in 
an IRS district, and reflects the amount of downward adjustment to taxable income the 
taxpayer may claim. We use two measures of income; SIMPLE is the total amount of 
wage, interest, and dividend income reported on returns, and COMPLEX is the total 
amount of income from sources other than wages, interest, and dividends. Wages, in­
terest, and dividends were, in 1979, the easiest income items to be verified by the IRS. 
COMPLEX income therefore represents sources that are the most difficult to trace.20 
We report the per return mean values for these variables in Table 2. 
Table 2 
MEAN VALUES OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Category Non-paid Preparers Practitioners 
Mode IRS ONP SELF NTS LTS OPP PA ATT CPA 
Variable 
AGE65 .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 .153 
EDUCATE .673 .673 .673 .673 .673 .673 .673 .673 .673 
PERMAN .222 .222 .222 .222 .222 .222 .222 .222 .222 
RATE .018 .018 .018 .018 .018 .018 .018 .018 .018 
DEDUCT 4,835 4,736 6,090 5,128 5,454 5,607 6,220 8,237 9,986 
EXEMPT 2.098 1.793 2.122 2.532 2.700 2.490 2.662 2.642 2.811 
COMPLEX 950 1,271 1,563 2,186 3,205 4,103 5,878 9,432 15,400 
SIMPLE 9,716 9,456 14,417 15,508 17,306 17,314 20,112 24,980 34,304 
Sources: Special Academic Research File of the 1979 Individual Return TCMP, 
1979 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
20The TCMP provides not only what the tax return reported amounts were, but what the IRS believed 
the true amount to be. We use the corrected amounts of deductions and exemptions as meaningful 
measures of the true amounts of these items. For deductions and exemptions this avoids at least two 
problems. The first is that many people claimed extra deductions for withholding purposes in anticipation 
of large deduction amounts on the tax return. The second is, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, certain 
exemptions (such as the number of dependents) claimed on returns were difficult to verify by the IRS. 
This lead to excessive claims of exemptions on returns. Therefore, exemptions may have been part of 
a tax evasion strategy, obscuring true identification of the taxpayer's situation. For example, in 1987, 
the first year that social security numbers were required for all exemptions claimed, the number claimed 
fell by over 7 million, with the bulk coming from returns that claimed multiple exemptions on 1986 
returns claiming none (beyond the personal exemption) in 1987. The use of the corrected amount of 
exemptions eliminates these problems, and after subtracting exemptions for blindness and over 65 years 
of age reflects the number of persons supported by the taxpayer. Although their findings of unreported 
income may understate the true amount, we use the IRS corrected amounts for both income variables 
as proxies for the trne level of income. In particular, greater amounts of nonwage reflect larger tax 
1• 1 .,., • 1 • • , , ' , '" ', l' • • • i1aouu;1es ana mcreasmg1y more comp1ex retiurns oecause 01ten 11nese sources 01 mcome requll"e separatie 
forms, and special accounting procedures, (as with capital gains, business and partnership income, and 












The choice of third party assistance is estimated in two stages, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
In the first stage we estimate separate choice models for specific alternatives from within 
the three categories defined above. The first of these categories, non-paid assistance, 
includes the IRS and ONP alternatives. The second, paid preparers, includes the LTS, 
NTS, OPP, and PA alternatives. The third, practitioners, includes the ATT and CPA 
alternatives. Each of these models takes the form:21 
log [F;j;l = /3o;1; + /31 ;1;AGE65 + /32;1;EDUCAT E + /3s;1;P ERM AN+ /34;1;RATE 
F111J 
+/3s;1;(DEDUCT;1; -DEDUCT11;) + /36;1;(EXEMPT;1; -EXEMPT11;) 
+/3r;1;(COMPLEX;1; -COMPLEX11;) 
(16) 
In the second stage we estimate a choice model for the four categories, nonpaid 
assistance (ms or ONP) , self prepared (SELF) , paid preparer (LTS, NTS, OPP, or 
PA) , and practitioner (ATT or CPA) . This model has the form: 
-
log [ii] - 'l'Oi + "'f1 ;AGE65 + "'f2;EDUCATE + "'fs;PERMAN + "'f4;RATE
+"'ts;(DEDUCT; - DEDUCT1) + "'fs;(EXEMPT; - EXEMPT1) 
+"'t1;(COMPLEX; -COMPLEX1) + "'ts;(SIMPLE; -SIMPLE1) 
+D;(INCV; -INCVi), (17) 
where INCV; is the inclusive value derived from the stage one estimates.22 In equation
21The normalization by alternative one in equation (16) is arbitrary. In the first stage models we use 
the PA, CPA, and IRS alternatives respectively as normalizations. In the second stage model we use
the self-preparation category for the normalization. 
22Two issues arise with this specification. The first is that we have excluded the state tax and 
12 
(15) we use the self-prepared category for normalization as the inclusive value for 
alternatives in this category is zero. 
5 Results 
Tables 3 and 4 present our results for the sequential estimation of the aggregate nested 
logit model. For the socio-economic variables, AGE65, EDUCATE, and PERMAN, 
the coefficients are interpreted as the effect on the log odds from a 1 percent change 
in those rates, while DEDUCT, COMPLEX, and SIMPLE assess the effect of a one­
thousand dollar per return change on the log odds. EXEMPT measures the change 
from an additional exemption per return on the log odds. The measure of goodness of 
fit we report is a modified R2 statistic derived in Buse (1973) and discussed in Amemiya 
(1981).23 
Table 3 shows results from the stage one estimation. The first three columns show 
the estimated log odds equations for the National Tax Service, Local Tax Service, Other 
Paid Preparer, and Public Accountant alternatives. Considering first socio-economic 
variables, increases in the percent of the adult population over 65 tend to increase the 
likelihood of using a public accountant compared to other paid preparers. Increases 
in the.percent of the workforce employed in manufacturing industries significantly in­
creases the likelihood of using a public accountant compared to any other paid preparer 
(a result which has no immediate explanation) . Finally, education has no effect on the 
choice between paid preparers. 
A more interesting observation is that increases in the federal audit rate decrease 
the likelihood of using either a national or local tax service compared to the use of a 
public accountant, but have no effect on the choice between other paid preparers and 
public accountants. We surmise that this result follows from a perception by taxpayers 
that public accountants better shield them from audits or, in case the taxpayer does 
get audited, better represent the taxpayer than do tax services. 
With respect to tax return items, we get a variety of significant results, but no 
obvious pattern is discernable. 
unemployment rates. We found no effect from these variables in any of the models estimated, and so 
excluded them from the models presented. The second issue concerns the potential endogeneity of the 
IRS audit rate with the choice of tax preparation mode. Based on the test developed in Hausman (1978) 
we could not reject the exogeneity of the audit rate in our model. 
23The statistic is (W 88}4-W88R,,)/W 88R, where W 88!4 is the weighted sum of squared residuals 
from minimum chi-square estimation of a restricted model consisting of alternative specific constants 
only and WSSR� is the weighted sum of squared residuals from mini."!lum chi-square estL"Ilation of the 
unrestricted model. 
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Column four in Table 3 shows the estimated log odds for the CPA and attorney 
alternatives. Given that a taxpayer uses one of these practitioners, the choice between 
them is driven largely by exemptions and deductions. In particular, increases in exemp­
tions increase the demand for attorneys relative to CPA's, while increases in deductions 
decrease the demand for attorneys relative to CPA's. Neither the federal audit rate nor 
income has any effect on this choice, although increases in the percent of the population 
over 65 tend to favor attorneys over CPA's. 
The last column of Table 3 shows the estimated log odds for the IRS assistance and 
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance or Other Non-Paid alternatives. Even though only 
14 percent of the demand for non-paid preparers accrues to the IRS (Figure 1), we 
observe that increases in the federal audit rate decrease the relative demand for IRS 
assistance. This result may follow from taxpayer mistrust of the IRS in states where 
auditing is high, or because the IRS perceives there to be a trade-off between return 
assistance and auditing; i.e., in states where the audit rate is high, less effort may be 
devoted by the IRS to providing taxpayer assistance. 
With respect to tax return items, we observe a pattern of effects for the choice 
between IRS assistance and other nonpaid assistance similar to that found for the 
choice between attorneys and CP A's; increases in exemptions or decreases in deduction 
increase the demand for IRS assistance relative to other forms of nonpaid assistance. 
Table 4 presents results from the stage two estimation comparing the choice of non­
paid assistance, paid preparers, and practitioners, respectively, with self preparation. 
In these comparisons, the three socio-economic variables are largely insignificant. In 
fact, the choice between any form of third party assistance and self preparation is driven 
almost entirely by tax return items. The one exception, however, is an important one. 
Increases in the federal audit rate increase the demand for practitioners-CPA's or 
attorneys-relative to self preparation, but have no effect on the demand for nonpaid 
assistance or paid preparers relative to self preparation. Moreover, higher audit rates 
increase the demand for practitioners when the choice is between paid preparers and 
practitioners. 
With respect to tax return items, we observe a rather consistent set of effects: 
increases in exemptions generally increase the demand for third party assistance, espe­
cially paid assistance; increases in deductions generally decrease the demand for third 
party assistance (except for practitioners), and increases in complex income generally 
increase the demand for third party assistance (again except for practitioners). Income 
from wages, interest, or dividends is largely irrelevant. 
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Table 3 
STAGE 1 PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Log Odds NTS LTS OPP ATT IRS PA PA PA GPA ONP 
Variable 
( t-statistic) 
ONE 2.514 3.352 2.101 -1.433 -.298 
(2.639) (3.513) (2.273) (-1.815) (-.295) 
AGE65 -.03545 -.0483 -.0521 .0361 .0115 
{-1.630) (-2.291) (-2.036) {1.956) (.454) 
EDUCATE -.0065 -.0125 -.0071 .0066 .0001 
(-.715) (-1.293) (-.796) (.823) (.0062) 
PERMAN -.0328 -.0285 -.0216 .0126 -.0134 
(-3.378) (-2.862) (-2.293) (1.573) (-1.256) 
RATE -.2502 -.2864 -.0764 -.126 -.3399 
(-2.407) (-2.577) (-.791) (-1.081) (-2.179) 
EXEMPT .174 -.0001 .2604 .4535 .3194 
(2.872) (-2.962) (4.491) (5.234) (2.32) 
DEDUCT -.033 -.0479 .0196 -.0754 -.3184 
(-.833) (-1.548) (.495) (-2.819) (-2.006) 
COMPLEX .0316 .0377 .0096 -.0026 .0179 
(1.941) (2.091) (1.156) (-.338) (1.042) 
SIMPLE -.0007 .0193 -.0176 -.0095 .0007 
(.0544) (2.976) (-1.389) 
I
(-.617) (.201) 
R2 .75 .76 .57 
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Table 4 
STAGE 2 PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF 
Log Odds IRS&: ONP PAiLTS,NTS,OPP CPA & ATT Self Self Self 
Variable 
ONE -.922 -.101 -2.116 
(-1.328) (-.149) (-3.770) 
AGE65 .0374 .0087 .0151 
(1.732) (.723) (.967) 
EDUCATE -.0163 -.0001 .0007 
(-2.173) (-.109) (.129) 
PERMAN -.0100 -.0014 .0001 
(-1.548) (-.251) (.07792) 
RATE .0051 -.0039 .1569 
(.0729) (-.0691) (2.256) 
EXEMPT .0311 .0482 .0474 
(1.438) (3.879) (2.344) 
DEDUCT -.0297 -.0376 .0046 
(-2.421) (-4.826) (.426) 
COMPLEX .0204 .0079 .0076 
(2.278) (2.370) (1.646) 
SIMPLE .0001 .0314 -.0063 
(.115) (1.768) (-.182) 
INCrns&oNP .621 
(5.015) 
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6 Conclusion 
Our results suggest that the demand by taxpayers for third party assistance in the 
preparation of tax returns results from three influences, two of which have previously 
been emphasized in the literature, and one of which is new. 
The first influence is associated with taxpayers who demand special services, such 
as the ability to represent the taxpayer before the IRS. Tax practitioners are uniquely 
qualified to provide this service, and in states where federal audit rates are higher, so 
too is the demand for practitioner services. The second influence is associated with 
taxpayers who otherwise ir...ight prepare their ov1n returns if it \Vere not for uncertainty 
about their true tax liability. For these taxpayers, greater amounts of income from 
sources other than wages, interest, or dividends increase the demand for third party 
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assistance, presumably because these types of income require additional tax forms and 
special accounting procedures in order to determine the correct tax liability. The third 
influence is associated with increases in the tax burden, as measured by the number 
of tax dependents or amount of deductions. In particular, we find that when the 
number of tax dependents increases, the demand for third party assistance increases. 
Furthermore, contrary to the view that more deductions imply a more complex tax 
return, which should increase the demand for third party assistance, we find that more 
deductions reduce the demand for third party assistance. These two results, which 
have not previously appeared in the literature, we interpret as representing the effects 
of changes in the tax burden on the demand for third party assistance. 
We generally confirm the results of previous research, but with finer distinctions 
among the categories of third party assistance. For example, Erard (1990) shows that 
an increase in the federal audit rate increases the demand for practioners and for all 
other forms of third party assistance, with the latter treated as a single group. We 
also find that increases in the federal audit rates increase the demand for practitioners, 
but not for paid preparers or nonpaid assistants, which we treat as separate groups. 
Similarly, while the literature generally concludes that increase in complex income 
increase the demand for all types of third party assistance, we find that increase in 
complex income increase the demand for paid and nonpaid assistants, but not for 
practitioners. 
A logical extension of the demand for tax return preparation services presented 
here would be to estimate the amount of tax noncompliance attributable to returns 
conditional upon the mode of third party assistance used. This calculation requires 
estimation of two components of noncompliance. The first, presented here, is the change 
in demand for third party assistance, and the second is the change in noncompliance 
attributable to that mode of preparation. For example, an increase in the federal audit 
rate will increase the demand for practitioner services. If average noncompliance for 
this category falls by less than the proportionate increase in demand for practitioner 
services, then total noncompliance for this category is expected to increase. Our results 
have demonstrated that attendant with this increase in compliance will be a change in 
the composition of third party assistance. Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989b) , show that 
an increase in the federal audit rate is likely to increase total compliance. Therefore, 
we would expect a shift in the composition of non-compliance as individuals change 
their mode of tax preparation. 
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